Knowing better : virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press,
2015
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| Edition: | First edition |
| Series: | Oxford philosophical monographs |
| Subjects: | |
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Star, Daniel 1971- EUL10001075280 Y Knowing better virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics Daniel Star First edition Oxford, United Kingdom New York, NY Oxford University Press 2015 xvii, 147 p. 23 cm text txt rdacontent unmediated n rdamedia volume nc rdacarrier Oxford philosophical monographs Bibliogr.: p. 139-143. Two levels of ethical thinking -- The authority of reasons -- Virtue -- Knowing better. Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in general follow such philosophical principles. These principles are difficult to articulate and assess, and we do not (or should not) think that advanced philosophical expertise is a necessary requirement for virtue. At the same time, the virtuous do not only accidentally get things right; rather, they act well in a reliable fashion, and they do so by responding appropriately to genuine reasons. Daniel Star argues that the solution to this problem requires a new approach to understanding the relation between ethical theory and ordinary deliberation, a new way of thinking about the nature of practical authority and normative reasons, a new account of the nature of virtue, and a rethinking of how best to understand the role that knowledge plays in deliberation and action. -- Provided by publisher. könyv Ethics EUL10000017657 Y etika EUL10000018819 Y erkölcsfilozófia EUL10000091991 Y morálfilozófia EUL10000091991 N cselekvéselmélet filozófia EUL10000840689 Y EUL01 |
| language |
English |
| format |
Book |
| author |
Star, Daniel (1971-) |
| spellingShingle |
Star, Daniel (1971-) Knowing better : virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics Oxford philosophical monographs Ethics etika erkölcsfilozófia morálfilozófia cselekvéselmélet -- filozófia |
| author_facet |
Star, Daniel (1971-) |
| author_sort |
Star, Daniel 1971- |
| title |
Knowing better : virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics |
| title_sub |
virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics |
| title_short |
Knowing better |
| title_full |
Knowing better virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics Daniel Star |
| title_fullStr |
Knowing better virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics Daniel Star |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Knowing better virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics Daniel Star |
| title_auth |
Knowing better virtue, deliberation, and normative ethics |
| title_sort |
knowing better virtue deliberation and normative ethics |
| series |
Oxford philosophical monographs |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| publishDateSort |
2015 |
| physical |
xvii, 147 p. ; 23 cm |
| edition |
First edition |
| isbn |
9780199570416 0199570418 |
| callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-subject |
BJ - Ethics |
| callnumber-label |
BJ1012 |
| callnumber-raw |
42395 |
| callnumber-search |
42395 |
| topic |
Ethics etika erkölcsfilozófia morálfilozófia cselekvéselmélet -- filozófia |
| topic_facet |
Ethics etika erkölcsfilozófia morálfilozófia cselekvéselmélet -- filozófia Ethics etika erkölcsfilozófia morálfilozófia cselekvéselmélet filozófia |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-tens |
170 - Ethics |
| dewey-ones |
170 - Ethics |
| dewey-full |
170.44 |
| dewey-sort |
3170.44 |
| dewey-raw |
170.44 |
| dewey-search |
170.44 |
| first_indexed |
2023-12-27T12:47:24Z |
| last_indexed |
2023-12-29T19:55:32Z |
| recordtype |
opac |
| publisher |
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press |
| _version_ |
1786643620055482368 |
| score |
13,386982 |
| bibliography |
Bibliogr.: p. 139-143. |
| generalnotes |
Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in general follow such philosophical principles. These principles are difficult to articulate and assess, and we do not (or should not) think that advanced philosophical expertise is a necessary requirement for virtue. At the same time, the virtuous do not only accidentally get things right; rather, they act well in a reliable fashion, and they do so by responding appropriately to genuine reasons. Daniel Star argues that the solution to this problem requires a new approach to understanding the relation between ethical theory and ordinary deliberation, a new way of thinking about the nature of practical authority and normative reasons, a new account of the nature of virtue, and a rethinking of how best to understand the role that knowledge plays in deliberation and action. -- Provided by publisher. |